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NOTES
OPEN MEETINGS AND CLOSED
MOUTHS: ELECTED OFFICIALS’
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AFTER
GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS


“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his
judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he
sacrifices it to your opinion.”1
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INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2004, Katie Elms-Lawrence e-mailed three of her
fellow Alpine City Councilpersons to arrange a special meeting. Her
email spoke of the City’s ongoing search for an engineering firm and
the fact that she had just discussed one of the candidates they had
recently interviewed with Councilwoman Monclova. “[W]e both feel
Mr. Tom Brown was the most impressive . . . no need for
interviewing another engineer at this time,”2 her email read. Three
days later, Councilman Rangra responded to the e-mail and copied
two other councilpersons, saying that he would arrange the meeting.
Little did they know that this seemingly innocent exchange of emails
would lead District Attorney Frank Brown to indict Rangra, ElmsLawrence, Monclova, and another council member on criminal
charges of violating the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) several
months later.3
The District Attorney ultimately dropped the criminal charges, but
Rangra and Monclova filed a declaratory action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, seeking a judgment that the criminal provisions of TOMA
violated their First Amendment rights under the Free Speech Clause
and were unconstitutional both on their face and as applied to their
particular situation.4 The United States District Court for the Western
2 Rangra v. Brown, No. P-05-CV-075, 2006 WL 3327634, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7,
2006), rev’d, 566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir.
2009).
3 Id. at *3 (“The prosecution was based solely on the exchange of the e-mails.”).
4 Id. at *1–2.
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District of Texas dismissed the suit,5 reasoning that, because the
council members spoke in their official capacity, the First
Amendment had no application.6 A panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that TOMA acted as
a content-based restriction on the councilmember’s speech (a
designation that makes the Act inherently suspect) and remanded the
case with instructions for the district court to apply strict scrutiny. 7
The Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the matter en banc;8 however, before
the court heard arguments, it issued a one-line order dismissing the
case for mootness.9
Although the entire Fifth Circuit declined to reach the merits of the
appeal, the panel’s decision raises some interesting—and, indeed, farreaching—questions regarding the free speech rights of elected
officials and how open meeting laws may impinge upon these
freedoms. Part I of this Note provides some background on the
development of open meeting laws, including their pervasiveness and
commonly perceived benefits and drawbacks. Part II then discusses
the extent to which the Free Speech Clause of the Federal
Constitution should apply to elected officials acting in their official
capacity. While some courts have held that the recent Supreme Court
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos10 limits the free speech rights of all
government employees acting in their official capacity, this Note
argues that courts should treat elected officials differently. Rather
than having their rights hamstrung, elected officials should receive
the full protection of the First Amendment, even when acting in their
official capacities, because the nature of their relationship with their
“employer” is different from that of other government employees.
This Note argues that there are sufficient common-law justifications
for extending elected officials the full protections of the First
Amendment, and that Garcetti does nothing to alter this doctrine. Part
Id. at *8.
Id. at *6.
7 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 526–27 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by
584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that there was a fundamental difference between an elected
official’s role as a “state employee” and the role of ordinary state employees).
8 Rangra v. Brown, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009).
9 Rangra v. Brown, 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009). The vote was 16-1. Id at 207. Judge
Dennis (the author of the original panel opinion) issued a scathing dissent in which he intimated
that the “mootness” the court perceived stemmed from the fact that, during the four years of
litigation, all of the plaintiffs had either been defeated in their bids for re-election, or had been
prevented from running because of term-limits. Id. at 207–08 (Dennis, J., dissenting). He also
noted: “The only reason that has been advanced for dismissing this case prior to the date upon
which it had been set for en banc rehearing and oral argument, is that it would overtax the
judges of this court to prepare for oral argument on both the mootness question and the merits of
the appeal.” Id. at 209.
10 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
5
6
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III then looks at the various levels of First Amendment scrutiny
employed by the courts. After giving a brief overview of the two most
common forms of speech restriction (content-neutral and contentbased burdens), this Note argues that open meeting laws actually
regulate speech based upon subject matter. Subject-matter restrictions
pose a particular conundrum for courts as they can perpetuate the
same evils as either content-neutral or content-based burdens,
depending upon the circumstances. As such, courts should adjust the
level of scrutiny brought to bear on subject-matter restrictions in
accordance with the underlying First Amendment dangers that the
particular restriction poses. This requires a more nuanced analysis,
rather than a mechanical application of strict scrutiny.
Part IV then uses this framework to analyze both TOMA and the
Ohio open meeting law. It concludes that open meeting laws, which
choke off all means of communication on the subject of political
issues, pose a threat to free discussion and are contrary to basic First
Amendment principles. Furthermore, open meeting laws that impose
criminal penalties on individual violators are particularly insidious
because of the significant chilling effect they create. Finally, Part V
proposes several steps that states can take to reduce the burdens on
their elected officials’ First Amendment rights, including dispensing
with criminal penalties and clearly defining “meeting” in their
statutes. And, contrary to some critics’ contentions, these remedies
will enhance, rather than dilute, the level and quality of debate in
public bodies.
I. OPEN MEETING LAWS
Though many assume there is a constitutional “right” to attend
meetings of the government, this assumption is incorrect; there is, in
fact, no generally recognized common law or constitutional right for
the public to attend governmental meetings.11 However, every state

11 ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, OPEN MEETING LAWS § 1.1 (2d ed. 2000). See also Sandra F.
Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: A Model for
Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open
Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2008) (“[T]he right of the public to attend
government meetings is granted by government officials, not the common law. . . . [T]here is no
First Amendment right of access to government meetings.” (footnote omitted)). Although some
might analogize the right of access to government meetings with the right of access to criminal
trials, this analogy is inapposite. The public does, of course, have a presumptive constitutional
right to attend criminal trials. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580 (1980) (“We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972))).
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currently has some form of open meeting law.12 Though laws
requiring open government are actually a relatively new creation,13
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate have met in
public for the vast majority of their existence.14 Despite these early
inklings of openness, had open meeting laws been around in the
Eighteenth Century, the United States as we know it today may never
have come about—the Founders conducted the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 in total secrecy.15
Open meeting laws did not begin to crop up in a significant
fashion until the middle of the Twentieth Century. Alabama is
thought to have enacted the first “open meeting” law in 1915. And, as
late as 1950, it remained the lone state with a “comprehensive” open
meetings statute.16 In the years immediately following Watergate,
however, the states with open meeting laws rushed to expand them
and those without hastily enacted their own.17 Today, open meeting
laws have become so important to the appearance of open
government that over half the states make some mention of open
government in their constitutions.18
A. Why Sunshine Is the Best Disinfectant
The need for open meeting laws grew out of the impression that a
great deal of state and local decision making took place “behind
closed doors.”19 Perhaps this perception is what led Justice Brandeis
to remark: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;

12 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 3 (noting that these laws go by several names,
including “‘sunshine’ laws, open door laws, freedom of access acts, right to know laws, or
public meeting laws” (footnotes omitted)).
13 Id.
14 See Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the
Sunshine in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1167
(1993) (“Deliberations of the House of Representatives and the Senate were not opened to
reporters until 1790 and 1792 respectively.”). However, most congressional committees
continued to meet in private until the 1970s. SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 2.
15 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (“[A]ll records of those
meetings were sealed for more than 30 years after the Convention. Most of the Framers
acknowledged that without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have
been written.” (internal citations omitted)).
16 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 3.
17 Id. § 1.1, at 3–4. Chief Justice Warren famously remarked: “If anything is to be learned
from our present difficulties, compendiously known as Watergate, it is that we must open our
public affairs to public scrutiny on every level of government.” Earl Warren, Governmental
Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550 (1974).
18 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 2.
19 Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1199, 1199 (1962) [hereinafter The Right to Know].
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electric light the most efficient policeman.”20 But even this idea
needed decades to find traction. It wasn’t until the early 1960’s that
the public (or, more specifically, the media) sent the drive for open
meeting laws into high gear by sounding the now familiar rallying cry
of “[t]he people have a right to know!”21
This sentiment—the “right” to know—was one of the main ideas
driving the enactment of open meeting laws. In short, the principle is
that government officials should conduct the public’s business in
public.22 This principle is rooted in the idea that “government is and
should be the servant of the people.”23 Open meeting laws facilitate
that service by “promot[ing] the free flow of information so that news
media may report events accurately rather than relying on potentially
biased or inaccurate leaks.”24 Thus, open meetings encourage
confidence in elected officials and reduce corruption.25 According to
some scholars, this openness allows the public to become more
involved in the decision-making process and affords them a better
understanding of the nuances of modern government.26

20

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92

(1914).
The Right to Know, supra note 19, at 1199.
See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 22–23 (“The overriding public policy is that
government is the public’s business and should be conducted in public so that the basis and
rationale for governmental decisions as well as the decisions themselves are easily accessible to
the people.” (footnote omitted)).
23 Lisa A. Reilly, The Government in the Sunshine Act and the Privacy Act, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 955, 956 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-880, at 2 (1976)).
24 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 3.6, at 33. Schwing goes on to note that other common
justifications include:
 promotion of stability and public confidence in government;
 improved ability of the people to evaluate public officials and their activities by being
privy to the decision-making process so that the public can vote intelligently in elections;
 improved understanding of the decision-making process that enables people to consider
future government developments and the consequences of those developments;
 enhancement of the fact-finding process, because discrepancies and omissions can be
discovered and revealed, persons giving evidence are less able to conceal falsehood, and perjury
can be more easily discovered;
 greater control of governmental abuses;
 increased citizen participation in government; and
 better government responsiveness to the needs of the governed.
Id. § 3.6, at 34.
25 See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1166 (“Open meetings allow the public to observe how
their elected officials vote on issues. This information allows members of the public to
determine if public officials are truly acting in a representative capacity.”).
26 See, e.g., Michael A. Lawrence, Finding Shade from the “Government in the Sunshine
Act”: A Proposal to Permit Private Informal Background Discussions at the United States
International Trade Commission, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1995) (“Some proponents argue
that the openness of agency meetings allows the public to more clearly understand how the
government decisionmaking process operates, thereby leading to a greater opportunity for
public involvement in the process through enlightened voting and lobbying.”).
21
22
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While several states go so far as to explicitly outline the rationale
for open meetings in their constitutions,27 others simply include these
public policy justifications in their statutory schemes.28 Whatever the
form and wherever the locale, the underlying rationale is essentially
the same: open access to governmental decisions and deliberations is
an overriding public policy goal.29
B. But Too Much Disinfectant Can Be Toxic
Though originally touted30—and still heralded—by the media as
the best tonic for flushing out corrupt practices in government, open
meeting laws are not without their detractors.31 Though most
commentators generally agree that the ideals of open government and
accountability are laudable, some take issue with the mechanism for
attaining those goals.
The most consistent criticism of open meeting laws is that they
limit free debate and discussion among elected officials (and
members of other agency bodies subject to the laws) and drive the
substantive exchange of ideas further into the shadows.32 The
resulting loss of collegiality among the voting members of a public
body forces members to lean more heavily on their unelected staffs.
27 See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. VIII (“All power residing originally in, and being
derived from, the people, all the magistrates and officers of government are their substitutes and
agents, and at all times accountable to them. Government, therefore, should be open, accessible,
accountable and responsive. To that end, the public’s right of access to governmental
proceedings and records shall not be unreasonably restricted.”).
28 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 22–23.
29 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.1 (West 2010) (“This chapter seeks to assure, through
a requirement of open meetings of governmental bodies, that the basis and rationale of
governmental decisions, as well as those decisions themselves, are easily accessible to the
people. Ambiguity in the construction or application of this chapter should be resolved in favor
of openness.”).
30 See The Right to Know, supra note 19, at 1199 (“Organized activities to this end [the
enactment of open meeting laws] began in 1950 when the Freedom of Information Committee
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors directed its attention to the problems of domestic
news suppression. . . . [T]he press . . . has remained the principal moving force behind the
campaign.” (footnote omitted)).
31 See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the
Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 13 (2004) (“[Open meeting laws] often create more barriers
to the attainment of [their] objectives than if the laws did not exist.”); Lawrence, supra note 26,
at 11 (noting that officials of major regulatory agencies “believed that the presence of the press
and public under open meeting statutes subtly inhibit[s] the free exchange of ideas and
opinions.”).
32 E.g., Johnson, supra note 31, at 25–29; see also David M. Welborn et al., The Federal
Government in the Sunshine Act and Agency Decision Making, 20 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 465, 473
(1989) (“Among the more important [inhibitions] reported by agency participants are . . . [that
the laws] ‘take the sting out of debate,’ as one member put it; . . . impede development of an
informed consensus among members after a thorough exchange of views; and . . . generally
limit the flow of information, the depth of critical collective scrutiny given to matters before the
agency, and strategic speculation and planning.”).
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Thus, many public officials now conduct any significant, substantive
discussions on complex and controversial policy questions with their
staff members, rather than with the other members of the public
body.33
From 1976–1982, Professor David Welborn surveyed the effects
of the newly enacted Government in the Sunshine Act (the federal
“open meeting law”).34 His study found that, in the period just prior to
the enactment of the Act, 80.1% of agency members responding felt
that their agency discussed “important matters” in formal meetings. 35
An overwhelming number of respondents (over 85%) also indicated
that they made their decisions on most issues after these discussions
in formal meetings.36 Welborn then surveyed members of the affected
bodies after the Federal Sunshine Law took effect, and the vast
majority of respondents (over 83%) noted that they now came to
conclusions about issues prior to the formal discussions at these new
“open meetings.”37
This likely explains the sharper criticism leveled against those
states with laws barring pre-decisional discussions. These states go so
far as to forbid members of a public body to “hear, discuss, [or]
deliberate . . . on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the legislative body,” outside of an open meeting. 38 While the
likely purpose of these prohibitions is to prevent members of public
bodies from meeting in small groups—thereby evading open meeting
requirements—these broad prohibitions are cumbersome to enforce
and strict adherence is, in most cases, unrealistic.39
Viewing open meeting laws in the context of the First Amendment
magnifies these concerns, especially when the state imposes criminal
penalties on violators. Though some states do provide limited

33 See Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act:
Its Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 483 (1997)
(“Since a commissioner may not discuss or debate with all of her colleagues, she will often turn
to discussions with staff members.”).
34 Welborn, supra note 32, at 466.
35 Id. at 471.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54952.2(a) (West 2010). See also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 551.001(4)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (“‘Meeting’ means: a deliberation between a
quorum of a governmental body, or between a quorum of a governmental body and another
person, during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has
supervision or control is discussed or considered or during which the governmental body takes
formal action . . . .”).
39 See Johnson, supra note 31, at 15 (“To capture all discussions merely because they are
called deliberations is an impossibility. To try to do so only guarantees that fewer discussions
and deliberations will take place, and that fewer wise decisions will be made.”).
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exceptions for chance encounters or social gatherings,40 the chilling
effect these provisions can have on speech is of paramount concern.
C. And What’s Really in this “Best of Disinfectants”?
Although the laws vary from state to state in scope, content, and
application, they have a number of similar veins. For instance, the
vast majority of states apply their open meeting laws to almost all of
their political subdivisions.41 Additionally, every state requires open
meetings of public bodies unless a specific statute or provision
authorizes a closed meeting.42 In order to have an “open meeting,” the
body must publish (usually several days in advance) notice of the
time, place, and (in some states) scope of the meeting.43 Generally,
most states also break meetings down into three categories: regular,
special, and emergency, with slightly less burdensome notification
requirements for the latter two.44
Despite these overarching similarities, the reach and “bite” of open
meeting acts still varies widely from state to state.45 One way to judge
the scope and effect of a state’s open meeting law is to look at how
the statute defines “meeting.”46 Some, like Texas, define the term
broadly. Under the Texas Code, a “meeting” is defined as: “a
deliberation between a quorum of a governmental body, or between a
quorum of a governmental body and another person, during which
public business or public policy over which the governmental body
has supervision or control is discussed or considered or during which
the governmental body takes formal action.”47 Other states, like Ohio,
40 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 6.52, at 312–14 (noting that some states forbid
“informal” meetings of a quorum or more, other states allow these, so long as they comply with
the open meeting law, and others merely state that informal meetings or chance encounters may
not be used to circumvent the open meeting law).
41 Id. § 4.22, at 72. Curiously, some of these same state legislatures see it fit to exempt
themselves from these laws. Nevertheless, their own rules often require them to publish detailed
minutes and/or a journal of their proceedings. See id. § 4.80, at 130–33.
42 Id. § 6.4, at 258. (“[A]ll states have now elected to require open meetings in the absence
of a specific provision requiring or permitting closure.”).
43 See generally id. § 5. For example, Ohio requires that: “Every public body, by rule,
shall establish a reasonable method whereby any person may determine the time and place of all
regularly scheduled meetings and the time, place, and purpose of all special meetings.” OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(F) (West 1994 & Supp. 2009). Texas’s act is similar: “A
governmental body shall give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each
meeting held by the governmental body.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.041.
44 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 5.10, at 172.
45 See id. §§ VI, VIII (discussing variations in states’ open meeting acts).
46 Id. § 6.6, at 258.
47 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4). The statute also has several specific exceptions
for “social functions,” even if a quorum is present, so long as either: there is no discussion of
public business, or the discussion of public business is “incidental” to the function. Id.
“Incidental,” is, of course, undefined. See id.
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take a much narrower approach. The Ohio Revised Code simply
defines a meeting as “any prearranged discussion of the public
business of the public body by a majority of its members.”48 Part IV
compares the way these two states define “meeting,” and how these
varying definitions can have important implications for the
constitutionality of the statute.
Additionally, the level of enforcement and the accompanying
penalties for violation vary greatly by state. For example, Ohio’s
statute requires that the court invalidate any formal action that is not
adopted in an open meeting.49 The statute also provides a civil fine of
$500, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.50 Provisions like
these are common in nearly all states. Some states, however, go
further, and impose criminal penalties on violators,51 often in the form
of fines and/or imprisonment for up to six months.52 While most
states require a knowing violation for the criminal penalties to kick in,
a few states, such as Arkansas, even impose these criminal sanctions
for merely negligent violations of their open meetings act.53 Statutes
like these rest on particularly precarious constitutional footing
because of the chilling effect they can have on core political speech.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
A complete journey through the muddled thicket of First
Amendment theories is beyond the scope of this Note. Nonetheless,
several guiding principles bear mentioning. Chief among these is the
notion that free speech is indispensible to the idea of liberty and
freedom of thought.54 Consequently, “debate on public issues should
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2).
Id. § 121.22(H). Almost all states provide for this type of remedy. See SCHWING, supra
note 11, § 8.62, at 513 & n.282 (collecting statutes and noting that “[a] number of statutes
expressly require or empower the court to void any binding or final action taken at a meeting not
in compliance with the open meeting law”).
50 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(I)(1)–(2).
51 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 8.58 at 507–09 (describing various states' civil penalties
for violations of open meeting laws);); see also id. § 8.62 at 513–26 (describing various state
provisions which invalidate actions taken in violation of open meeting laws).
52 Compare 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 714 (2010) (imposing fine of up to $100 plus cost
of prosecution), with TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.143(b) (conviction punishable by fine of
$100 to $500, or one to six months imprisonment, or both).
53 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-104 (2004 & Supp. 2010) (“Any person who
negligently violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a class C
misdemeanor.”); id. § 5-4-401 (person convicted of a class C misdemeanor may be punished by
up to 30 days in jail).
54 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
48
49
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be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”55 This encourages the free
flow of thought and best facilitates the marketplace of ideas.56 While
it would seem that this cornerstone of First Amendment law is in
perfect harmony with the bedrock principle of open meeting laws
(i.e., that meetings should be open in order to facilitate public
understanding of the governing process), a brief glance over this
rocky ledge belies this illusion and reveals the abyss below.
The First Amendment also stands on the proposition that
individuals should be free to decide for themselves, rather than be
compelled by the government, what ideas they accept and want to
express.57 The evil inherent in this so-called “compelled speech” is
that it distorts the marketplace of ideas. If we allow the government
not only to force the electorate to listen to the state’s views, but also
to compel its citizens to advocate and spread those views, we give the
government an extraordinary power to slant the marketplace to suit its
whims. Thus, the right to refrain from speaking is just as important as
the ability to enter the marketplace of ideas and advocate your own
positions.
Finally, the First Amendment is not absolute; its freedom is not
unqualified.58 After all, the text of the First Amendment speaks of

public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.”).
55 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
56 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
57 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system
and cultural life rest upon this ideal.”). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”).
58 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (“[T]he First . . . Amendment[]
[has] never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or
wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses.”);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49–51 (1961) (“At the outset we reject the view
that freedom of speech and association as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
are ‘absolutes’ . . . . Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two
ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited
license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been
considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. On the other hand, general regulatory
statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered
exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade
Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid
governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a
weighing of the governmental interest involved.” (footnote and internal citations omitted)).
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“abridgment” and not an all-out prohibition of regulation.59 This
inherently implies that the right to speak is limited in some way.
Indeed, many of the Supreme Court’s decisions are an attempt at
defining those limits. For instance, while the government “may not
favor one speaker over another,”60 it may restrict access to its
property for speech-related purposes in certain situations.61 The
government may also place reasonable, content-neutral time, place, or
manner restrictions on certain forms of expressive conduct, so long as
the government leaves open ample alternative means of
communication.62 Additionally, the government may proscribe speech
that is likely to incite or induce “imminent lawless action.”63 And,
there is that pesky little detail that “speech” must often be defined as
such before it receives the requisite protections.64
But these regulatory scenarios represent the exception, rather than
the rule. Rarely will the government have a free hand to restrict
speech as it pleases.65 In fact, the Supreme Court generally regards
any law or regulation based upon the content of the particular
59 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
60 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“In the
realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another.”).
61 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 (1985)
(“Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to
exercise their right to free speech on every type of government property without regard to the
nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.”).
62 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535–36 (1980) (“This Court
has recognized the validity of reasonable time, place, or manner regulations that serve a
significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative channels for
communication. . . . [T]he essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate
governmental goals.”).
63 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
64 In other words, the speech must be considered “speech.” See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (“Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no
more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity ‘as not
being speech at all.’ What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity,
defamation, etc.)–not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so
that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively
proscribable content.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
65 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) (“Laws
designed or intended to suppress or restrict the expression of specific speakers contradict basic
First Amendment principles”); Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“When any law restricts speech, even for a purpose that has nothing to do with
the suppression of communication . . . we insist that it meet the high First-Amendment standard
of justification.”).
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message a speaker conveys as presumptively unconstitutional.66 And
government discrimination based upon the speaker’s viewpoint is
even more inherently suspect.67 In these cases of so-called viewpoint
discrimination, courts apply strict scrutiny.68
With these basic tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence as
guideposts, the remainder of this Section analyzes the contours of free
speech protection the Constitution affords public employees and
elected officials. It argues that there are fundamental differences
between elected officials and public employees that warrant higher
protection of the former’s speech, even when they act within the
ambit of their official duties. Furthermore, it argues that analogies to
public-employee free speech cases, though providing a useful
framework, should not be controlling, especially when the
government attaches criminal violations to an elected official’s
exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
A. Public Employee Free Speech
No Supreme Court case deals directly with the First Amendment
rights of elected officials in the context of open meeting laws.
Recently, however, elected officials have challenged restrictions of
their First Amendment rights in several federal district courts.69
Judges in these cases have generally looked to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos70 when determining the extent of

66 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”);
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”).
67 See R.A.V., 515 U.S. at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of
content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.”).
68 Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007) (“It is true enough that
content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid. We have recognized . . . that the
rationale of the general prohibition . . . is that content discrimination raises the specter that the
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
69 See, e.g., Hartman v. Register, No. 1:06-CV-33, 2007 WL 915193, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 26, 2007) (applying Garcetti to restrict Township Trustee’s First Amendment rights when
acting pursuant to his official duties in opposing passage of the minutes); Hogan v. Twp. of
Haddon, Civil No. 04-2036 (JBS), 2006 WL 3490353, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2006) (applying
Garcetti to hold that elected Township Commissioner has no First Amendment rights when
acting in her official capacity); Rangra v. Brown, No. P-05-CV-075, 2006 WL 3327634, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2006), rev’d, 566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by
584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (“For purposes of determining what constitutes protected speech
under the First Amendment, there is no meaningful distinction among public employees,
appointed public officials, and elected public officials.”).
70 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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First Amendment protection to afford the speech of elected officials
acting in their official capacity.71
In Garcetti, Ceballos (a calendar deputy in the Los Angeles
County District Attorney’s Office) prepared a disposition
memorandum recommending that the District Attorney dismiss a
pending case because of a faulty warrant.72 Ceballos’s supervisors
decided to go ahead with the prosecution anyway, despite a “heated”
discussion with Ceballos.73 Ceballos alleged that, as a result of his
criticism of the office’s handling of the case, his supervisors subjected
him to a series of retaliatory actions, including transfer to a position
of lesser responsibility in a different jurisdiction and denial of a
promotion.74
The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did not
protect Ceballos’ memorandum. The Court held that when public
officials speak during the performance of their official duties, their
speech receives little—or, in most cases, no—First Amendment
protection against employer discipline.75 Only when an employee
speaks as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, does his
speech falls under the ambit of the First Amendment.76 But even then
the protection is more limited, and the government may still be able to
impose discipline if: 1) “the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter
of public concern,” and (if this answer is yes), 2) the interests of the
government in regulating that employee’s speech justify the burdens
placed on it.77
Originally, the government’s ability to regulate an employee’s
speech more readily than the speech of a private citizen stemmed
from Justice Holmes’ proposition that “[t]he petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman.”78 This proposition—that government employees
enjoyed absolutely no right to object when his employer placed
See cases cited supra note 69.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413–14.
73 Id. at 414.
74 Id. at 415.
75 See id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”) (emphasis
added).
76 See id. at 417 (“[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain
circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”).
77 See id. at 418 (“[T]wo inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections
accorded to public employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employee spoke
as a citizen on a matter of public concern. [The second,] whether the relevant government entity
had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public.”).
78 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.).
71
72

2/14/2011 4:20:03 PM

2011]

OPEN MEETINGS AND CLOSED MOUTHS

563

conditions on his employment—was the norm for nearly 100 years.79
But it has since changed, and the Court now grounds the
government’s ability to discipline an employee, whether acting within
the scope of his employment or as a private citizen, in its interests as
an employer.80 As such, when the government employee takes off his
official-duty “hat,” and speaks in his capacity as private citizen, his
speech is generally protected unless the government can advance a
weighty enough interest to justify curtailing it. While his official-duty
“hat” is on, however, the employee must abdicate his First
Amendment rights in the name of efficiency and effectiveness.
The government’s interest in regulating employee speech is rooted
in the idea that, as an employer, it should be able to efficiently control
the conduct of its employees and send consistent messages. When the
right conditions are met, these interests are sometimes weighty
enough to justify burdening the employee’s First Amendment rights.81
Thus, so long as the government can show that the employee spoke
pursuant to her official duties, the First Amendment affords no
protection. And, even if the employee spoke “as a private citizen,” the
government may still be able to discipline the employee if it advances
a weighty enough interest.
It therefore appears settled that the government can justify
applying open meeting laws, like the Federal Sunshine Act, to
agencies, commissions, universities and other non-elected public
bodies under the rationale of Garcetti. Most open meeting acts limit
the reach of the law to business that is before,82 or, in some more
extreme cases, any business that may come before,83 the body. By
79 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“For most of this century, the
unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed
upon the terms of employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional
rights.”).
80 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as
sovereign.”).
81 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be
little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”); Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (“[W]here
the government is acting as employer, its efficiency concerns should . . . be assigned a greater
value.”); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it
is entitled to say what it wishes.”).
82 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2009) (defining
“meeting” as “any prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a
majority of its members”).
83 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (defining
a “meeting” as a gathering conducted by a government body with a quorum present “at which
the members receive information from, give information to, ask questions of, or receive
questions from any third person . . . about the public business or public policy over which the
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definition, then, the employee would be acting within the scope of his
employment, and thus would fall under the first prong of Garcetti
(employee speech pursuant to his official duty is not protected),84 and
therefore would be subject to governmental discipline. But this does
little to solve the problem of open meeting laws that impose criminal
penalties; Garcetti says only that the speech is not protected from
employer discipline.85
B. The Test from Garcetti Is Not an Appropriate Tool
to Analyze the Speech of Elected Officials
There is a fundamental difference between the mode of regulation
in cases like Garcetti (namely, employer disciplinary action)86 and the
penalties attached to violations of an open meeting law. The former
uses methods such as reprimand, reassignment, and, in extreme cases,
termination, while the latter “regulates” through criminal prosecution,
imposition of fines, and, in extreme cases, imprisonment.
Another problem arises when courts attempt to apply the rule in
Garcetti blindly to all public employees, regardless of their rank in
the bureaucratic hierarchy and their unique and varied relationships
with their employer. The issue lies in defining “public employee” in
the context of the Garcetti analysis. While in most cases it will
undoubtedly be clear, some courts have hesitated to apply Garcetti to
higher-ranking government officials.87 And Garcetti itself does not
draw a clear line. Although Ceballos exercised some supervisory
authority, he still had non-elected officials supervising him.88 This
ambiguity requires further parsing of the nebulous term “public
employee,” especially when that employee is an elected official.

governmental body has supervision or control”).
84 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
85 Id. See infra Part IV for a discussion of how the application of an open meeting law’s
criminal penalties would change the analysis.
86 See also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that a public
school teacher’s dismissal for making false statements was not justified without a showing that
the statements were made recklessly or knowingly)).
87 See Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Note, Government Employee, Are You a “Citizen”?:
Garcetti v. Ceballos and the “Citizenship” Prong to the Pickering/Connick Protected Speech
Test, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 589, 620–21 (2008) (discussing courts’ struggles to apply the Garcetti
standard to employees who are neither regular state employees nor state officials).
88 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2004). It appears from the
factual background that Ceballos had at least two non-elected officials supervising him:
“Ceballos discussed the problems arising from this investigation with others in the Office,
including his immediate supervisor, Carol Najera and the then-Head Deputy District Attorney,
Frank Sundstedt.” Id. at 1171.
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A closer inquiry reveals that elected officials are not covered by
the Garcetti test because they are not “employees,” as the Court uses
that term. Garcetti distinguishes speech uttered within the scope of
employment from that spoken in the employee’s individual
capacity.89 Whether an employee acts within the scope of his
employment depends in large part upon the control his principal
exerts over his actions.90 This right of control is lacking in the elected
official—electorate relationship. While, elected officials serve set
terms and are ultimately accountable to the electorate, “the people”
have no direct mode of control over their representatives’ day-to-day
actions. Citizens can, of course, write letters and lobby their city
councilperson to vote one way or another on an issue, but there are no
immediate repercussions if the councilperson chooses to ignore these
overtures. 91 And often there are citizens lobbying him to vote the
other way as well, so any sort of penalty for failing to listen to the
recommendations of the electorate would put the legislator in an
impossible Catch-22.
One might argue that, despite the fact that the electorate cannot
directly control their elected representatives, they can certainly
influence their decisions through various mechanisms (donations,
petitions, letters, rallies, etc.).92 This ability to influence, however,
does not necessarily give rise to the right to control,93 and the absence
of this right significantly alters the “employment” relationship of
elected officials. This deviation is sufficient to remove elected
officials from the purview of Garcetti.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. F (2006) (“An essential
element of agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions. . . . A relationship of
agency is not present unless the person on whose behalf action is taken has the right to control
the actor.”); id. § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) (“[A]n employee is an agent whose principal controls or has
the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.”).
91 At least, not the sort of repercussions seen in “public employee” cases like Garcetti and
Waters.
92 But see, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Critics of “Free Speech” and the Uses of the Past,
12 CONST. COMMENT. 29, 31 (1995) (“One metaphor embraced by advocates of representative
government is that of agency. . . . In the agency metaphor, the people are the principal, elected
officials are the agents . . . .”).
93 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). As the commentary makes clear:
The principal’s right of control in an agency relationship is a narrower and
more sharply defined concept than domination or influence more generally. Many
positions and relationships give one person the ability to dominate or influence other
persons but not the right to control their actions. . . . A relationship is one of agency
only if the person susceptible to dominance or influence has consented to act on
behalf of the other and the other has a right of control, not simply an ability to bring
influence to bear.
Id. cmt. f(1).
89
90
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Additionally, limiting the free speech rights of elected officials
would not serve the interests that allow the government to regulate
employee speech in the first place: efficiently and effectively
achieving its mission as an employer. When regulating the speech of
public employees like Ceballos, the government has sufficient
interests as an employer—promoting a consistent message,
maintaining discipline, etc.—to justify the burden it places on the
employee’s speech. These burdens are necessary to ensure that the
agency or governmental entity runs smoothly.94
This efficiency rationale simply does not apply in the case of
elected officials. Elected officials do not have a direct supervisor, but
rather, in many respects, elected officials are the individuals
responsible for making the policies and shaping the consistent
messages that the lower-level public employees must carry out. Our
national system of government is predicated upon republican
principles: the idea that the people have delegated their law-making
responsibility to a select few.95 Treating these select few as if they
were identical to all other public employees would severely restrict
their ability to govern and, in the process, undermine the conscious
choice we, as a people, made to found a republican form of
government.
Ideally, our representatives should be able to detach themselves
and step away from their private interests—even their self-interest in
reelection—when discussing and deliberating the merits of a
proposition.96 While in today’s partisan political atmosphere this may
seem slightly naïve, the Founders thought that the electorate should
only support the wisest and most virtuous candidates; those capable
of rising above the pressures of their private lives to determine what

94 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“The key to First
Amendment analysis of government employment decisions, then, is this: The government’s
interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as a sovereign to a significant one when it acts as
employer. . . . [W]here the government is acting as employer, its efficiency concerns
should . . . be assigned a greater value.”).
95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006) (“The
two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of
the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. . . . The effect
of . . . [this] difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations.”).
96 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1547–48
(1988) (arguing that, in a republic, “political participants [are] to subordinate their private
interests to the public good through political participation in an ongoing process of collective
self-determination”).
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is in the best interest of the common good. 97 They thought that the
ability to deliberate freely and without restraint was vital to
uncovering the common good, especially in times where popular
passions counseled an expedient course of action.98
Modern commentators (some part of the “Republican Revival”)
have indicated that it may not be in the public’s best interest for these
deliberations in search of the public good to be aired openly.99 Rather,
the deliberative process itself enables elected officials to step back
from their personal interests and “achieve a measure of critical
distance from prevailing desires and practices,” thereby allowing
them to subject these desires and practices to an unbiased review and
debate.100 Such a mechanism serves to “insulate political actors from
private pressure” and prevent attempts to undermine the deliberative
process.101 While strict record keeping, disclosure requirements, open
meetings, and public information statutes might allow for better
monitoring of the deliberative process, these measures come with
added costs.102 For instance, some of these requirements may unduly
burden deliberative bodies; others are cumbersome to enforce.103

97 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 316 (James Madison) (George Stade ed., 2006) (“The
aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in the
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they
continue to hold their public trust.”).
98 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006)
(“When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with
their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed, to be the guardians of
those interests; to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity
for more cool and sedated reflection.”); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1548–49 (“[D]eliberation
counsels political actors to achieve a measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and
practices, subjecting these desires and practices to scrutiny and review.”).
99 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV.
889 (1986). Professor Sunstein argues, “[I]f decisionmaking processes were exposed to public
view, disagreements and controversial views might not be aired at all. Similarly, a group is
unlikely to develop a coherent position if it is unable to explore, with some tentativeness, the
disparate options with which it is confronted. . . . If deliberations are disclosed while they are in
progress, organized groups with intense preferences may attempt to influence the outcome.” Id.
at 895–96.
100 Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1548–49.
101 Id. at 1549. Professor Sunstein notes that: “The requirement of deliberation is not
purely formal. . . . [D]eliberative processes are often undermined by intimidation, strategic and
manipulative behavior, collective action problems, adaptive preferences, or—most generally—
disparities in political influence.” Id. at 1549–50.
102 Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1627, 1664–65 (1999).
103 See id. (“As a general matter, such requirements might unduly burden these entities, and
such sunshine requirements would be awkward to enforce . . . .”). Issacharoff and Ortiz
continue: “Indeed, a significant branch of First Amendment law was forged in an effort to
protect the autonomy and privacy of dissident groups.” Id. at 1665.
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Thus it is clear that our republican form of government requires
that we allow the elected officials therein some breathing room. 104
The citizenry cannot afford to constantly hover behind their elected
officials, peering eagerly over their shoulders at every turn. If this
were truly what our Founders intended, they could have chosen to be
governed by a direct democracy. But they did not. And therefore, the
people cannot expect to instruct their elected representatives as if they
were ordinary “employees,” serving at the beck-and-call of their
“employer.” As such, a degree of separation is not only appropriate,
but necessary to the maintenance of our form of republican
government.
In fact, the Founders debated whether the citizenry should have
this very right: a right to instruct their representatives. But, as the
British Statesman Edmund Burke pointed out: “Your representative
owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays,
instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”105 The First
Congress seemed to share Burke’s sentiment as it debated this
proposed addition to the First Amendment, which would have given
citizens the right “to instruct their representatives.”106
During the spirited debate that ensued, Representative Thomas
Hartley argued that “the principle of representation is distinct from an
agency,” and that “the people ought to have confidence in the honor
and integrity of those they send forward to transact their business.”107
He noted specifically that during the times when the People’s
passions were inflamed and their mood intransigent, binding
instructions would be particularly problematic and antithetical to the
core purposes of representation. Rather, he felt that insulating
representatives from being bound by such reactionary opinions was a
virtue, one necessary for the Union’s existence.108
Representatives George Clymer and Roger Sherman also decried
the proposed addition. Rep. Clymer put his opposition in no uncertain
terms:

104 Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive . . . .”).
105 BURKE, supra note 1, at 10.
106 1 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 138 (Thomas Hart Benton ed., 1857).
107 Id.
108 Id. Hartley specifically said:
When the passions of the people are excited, instructions have been resorted
to and obtained, to answer party purposes; and although the public opinion is
generally respectable, yet at such moments it has been known to be often wrong; and
happy is that Government composed of men of firmness and wisdom to discover,
and resist popular error.
Id.
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This is a most dangerous principle, utterly destructive of all
sides of an independent and deliberative body, which are
essential requisites in the Legislatures of free Governments;
they prevent men of abilities and experience from rendering
those services to the community that are in their power,
destroying the object contemplated by establishing an
efficient General Government and rendering Congress a mere
passive machine.109
Rep. Sherman thought that such an addition would defeat the
purpose of having a deliberative body in the first place.
I think, when the people have chosen a representative, it is his
duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and
consult, and agree with them to such acts as are for the
general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be
guided by instructions, there would be no use in
deliberation . . . .110
Sherman also thought such a right unnecessary because a
representative had a duty to discover and act in the best interests of
the general welfare. If his instructions were on point, they would be
redundant. If they were to the contrary, he must, by virtue of his
position, “be bound by every principle of justice to disregard
them.”111
James Madison (at the time, a Representative from Virginia) also
participated in the debate. Madison felt that, because the First
Amendment already included the freedoms of speech and petition, a
“right to instruct,” if it was not binding, would simply be
superfluous.112 If, however, the People could issue binding
instructions to their legislators, then Madison felt this was a
“dangerous” proposition; and one to be avoided.113 In the end, the
109 Id.

at 139.

110 Id.
111 Id.

Sherman said:
It is the duty of a good representative to inquire what measures are most likely
to promote the general welfare, and, after he has discovered them, to give them his
support. Should his instructions, therefore, coincide with his ideas on any measure,
they would be unnecessary ; if they were contrary to the conviction of his own mind,
he must be bound by every principle of justice to disregard them.
Id.
112 Id. at 141 (“The right of freedom of speech is secured ; the liberty of the press is
expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government ; the people may therefore
publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by
petition to the whole body ; in all these ways they may communicate their will.”).
113 Id. Madison said:
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proposed “right to instruct” failed, with ten votes in favor and fortyone against.114
Thus, it appears that elected officials have an inherently different
relationship with their “employer” than other public employees. As
such, the test from Garcetti is not an appropriate mechanism to
analyze their free speech rights. Subjecting our elected
representatives, who act in essence as trustees for the general good, to
an analysis more aptly suited for determining the rights of agents,
severely undercuts their legislative autonomy and the republican
principles upon which our government was founded. It is therefore
inappropriate for courts to wield Garcetti like a hatchet to cut off the
hand when only the pinky need be amputated.
C. Elected Official’s Free Speech Rights
The Supreme Court has yet to address the free speech rights of
elected officials in the wake of Garcetti—and it has never squarely
addressed the extent of their free speech protection when they are
performing their official duties. The intent of the Framers, however,
in specifically including the Speech or Debate Clause in the
Constitution (before they adopted the First Amendment, mind you)
may shed some light on how they viewed the free speech rights of
elected officials. Additionally, the jurisprudential landscape is not
completely barren regarding the free speech rights of politicians, and
there are several decisions that help guide our way.
1. Interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause
The Speech or Debate Clause provides: “[F]or any Speech or
Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place.”115 James Wilson (a drafter of the
clause and one of George Washington’s six original appointments to
the Supreme Court)116 felt that the Speech or Debate Clause was an
indispensible component of the Constitution because it “enable[d] and

My idea of the sovereignty of the people is, that the people can change the
constitution if they please; but while the constitution exists, they must conform
themselves to its dictates. But I do not believe that the inhabitants of any district can
speak the voice of the people; so far from it, their ideas may contradict the sense of
the whole people; hence the consequence that instructions are binding on the
representative is of a doubtful, if not of a dangerous nature.
Id.
114 See

id. at 144.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
116 COMM’N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS AND ITS JUSTICES 1790–1991 60 (1992).
115 U.S.
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encourage[d] a representative of the publick [sic] to discharge his
publick [sic] trust.”117 Wilson felt that representatives should “enjoy
the fullest liberty of speech, and that [they] should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offence [sic].”118
The Supreme Court, however, did not construe the Clause until
1880 in Kilbourn v. Thompson.119 There, the Court noted that the
speech or debate privilege derived from the English Parliament and
that soon after its adoption in that body, it had become “indispensible
and universally acknowledged.”120 The Kilbourn Court then quoted
favorably from Chief Justice Parsons’ opinion in Coffin v. Coffin,121
which gave the Clause a liberal interpretation.122 The Court even went
so far as to extend the privilege beyond mere words spoken in the
House or Senate to written reports, resolutions, votes, and other things
“generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it.”123
In more recent times, the Supreme Court has upheld this broad
reading because the privilege ensures legislative independence.124 The
legislative history shows that the Framers intended the Clause to act
117 JAMES WILSON, Of the Constitution of the United States and of Pennsylvania—of the
Legislative Department, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967), quoted in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
118 Id.
119 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
120 Id. at 202 (quoting Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B.) 1156).
Lord Denman elaborated in Stockdale:
The privilege of having their debates unquestioned, though denied when the
members began to speak their minds freely . . . was soon clearly perceived to be
indispensable and universally acknowledged. By consequence, whatever is done
within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place.
For speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person,
or hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity.
Stockdale, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1156, quoted in Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 202.
121 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
122 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 203 (“These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of
the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office. . . . I,
therefore, think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full
design of it may be answered.” (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808))).
123 Id. at 204. The Court went on:
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words
spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written
reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which,
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it
is done vocally or by passing between the tellers.
Id.
124 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (“The legislative privilege,
protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile
judiciary, is one manifestation of the ‘practical security’ for ensuring the independence of the
legislature.”).
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as a shield for legislators against abusive encroachments by the other
branches.125 Additionally, in United States v. Brewster,126 the
Supreme Court said: “[T]he purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause
is to protect the individual legislator, not simply for his own sake, but
to preserve the independence and thereby the integrity of the
legislative process.”127
Thus, there appear to be two overriding motivations for the Speech
or Debate Clause. First, the Framers placed a high value on
legislators’ ability to debate freely. This includes, presumably,
freedom not only from prosecution, but also from other extraneous
influences that would have a similar chilling effect on their ability to
openly debate the merits of a proposition without fear of retaliation or
suppression. Second, the drafters intended that the Clause serve as an
additional buffer protecting the legislative branch in the event of an
overreaching executive or a hostile judiciary.
Though only tangentially related to the broader notion of free
speech, these considerations help to focus our analysis of elected
officials’ free speech rights. In choosing to exempt congressional
speech or debate from question “in any other place,” the Framers
recognized not only the right of legislators to speak, but also the right
of the legislative branch, as a whole, to be free of encroachment from
the other branches.
2. The Extent of Elected Officials’ First Amendment Rights
The proposition that the free speech rights of elected officials are
more limited than those of ordinary citizens seems (at first blush, at
least) rather counterintuitive. Nonetheless, this is what several courts
have held.128 Garcetti has invited an increase in these rulings, with
several federal district courts applying that rationale and finding that
elected politicians acting in their official capacity receive no First

125 Id. at 180–81 (“[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not
born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits such as those in Kilbourn and Tenney, but rather
to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”).
126 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
127 Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
128 See, e.g., Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345, 350 (Colo. 1984) (“We conclude that the Open
Meetings Law strikes the proper balance between the public's right of access to information and
a legislator's right to freedom of speech. The people have determined that they are willing to
assume the detriment of a potential stifling of discussion among legislators to secure the
advantages of open government.”); Kansas ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 646 P.2d 1091, 1099
(Kan. 1982) (“The First Amendment does indeed protect private discussions of governmental
affairs among citizens. Everything changes, however, when a person is elected to public
office. . . . Elected officials have no constitutional right to conduct governmental affairs behind
closed doors.”).
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Amendment protections.129 But the Supreme Court of the United
States has not endorsed this application.130 In fact, such an application
appears to go against a seemingly clear line of precedent that
emanates from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wood v. Georgia131
and Bond v. Floyd,132 both of which intimate that elected officials
receive full First Amendment protections even when they act in their
official capacities.133
In Wood, a county sheriff was indicted for contempt of court
because he made public statements criticizing local court proceedings
related to redistricting. The indictment specified that the sheriff made
the statement in his capacity as a citizen and not in his official
capacity as sheriff.134 Nevertheless, Georgia argued that because
Wood was a sheriff, “his right to freedom of expression must be more
severely curtailed than that of an average citizen.”135 The Court
explicitly rejected this argument,136 stating that even if Wood spoke in

129 See, e.g., Hartman v. Register, No. 1:06-CV-33, 2007 WL 915193, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 26, 2007) (“Garcetti . . . makes clear that speech made pursuant to an individual's official
duties is not protected by the First Amendment. The distinction between the public employee in
Garcetti and an elected official, in this case, Plaintiff, is inconsequential.”); Hogan v. Twp. of
Haddon, No. 04-2036 (JBS), 2006 WL 3490353, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2006) (elected township
commissioner protested the withholding of an article she authored and submitted for publication
to the town newspaper, but “because her submissions were made in her capacity as a Township
commissioner (and not a private citizen), [she] has no First Amendment rights . . . .”); Rangra v.
Brown, No. P-05-CV-075, 2006 WL 3327634, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2006), rev’d, 566 F.3d
515 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Because the
speech at issue is uttered entirely in the speaker’s capacity as [an elected] member of a
collective decision-making body, and thus is the kind of communication in which he or she is
required to engage as part of his or her official duties, it is not protected by the First
Amendment . . . .”).
130 Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 991 (7th Cir. 2010) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting
that, with reference to the Pickering–Garcetti line of cases, “[n]either this court nor the
Supreme Court . . . has ever held that these decisions limiting the speech of public employees
can be applied to elected officials’ speech”).
131 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
132 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
133 See also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781–82 (2002) (“The role
that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed
freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.” (quoting Wood, 370 U.S.
at 395)); X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) (“One does not lose one’s
right to speak upon becoming a legislator.”); Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 532 (1st Cir.
1989) (“[W]e have no difficulty finding that the act of voting on public issues by a member of a
public agency or board comes within the freedom of speech guarantee of the first amendment.
This is especially true when the agency members are elected officials.”); Wrzeski v. City of
Madison, 558 F. Supp. 664, 667 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (“Plaintiff’s status as a legislator does not
strip her of any rights she would otherwise enjoy under the First Amendment to speak freely or
not to speak at all. . . . Courts have repeatedly analyzed freedom of speech cases in the
legislative context without the use of any special First Amendment standard.”).
134 Wood, 370 U.S. at 380–81.
135 Id. at 393.
136 Id. (“Under the circumstances of this case, this argument must be rejected.”).
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his capacity as sheriff, that fact provided no basis for curtailing his
right to free speech.137
The petitioner was an elected official and had the right to
enter the field of political controversy, particularly where his
political life was at stake. The role that elected officials play
in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be
allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current
public importance.138
The Court elaborated on the extent of elected officials’ First
Amendment protection in Bond v. Floyd.139 In that case, Bond, a
newly elected member of the Georgia House of Representatives, filed
suit after the Clerk of the House refused to administer his oath of
office. The Clerk demanded that Bond retract certain statements—
made after he was elected, but before he took office—opposing the
Vietnam War. He reasoned that Bond could not, in good faith, take
the oath of office because his statements opposing the war gave aid
and comfort to the enemy, and were thus in conflict with the Georgia
Constitution.140 Georgia specifically argued that the court must hold
an elected legislator to a higher standard than a private citizen for the
purpose of analyzing his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court
disagreed.141 The Court again reasoned that elected representatives
should have wide latitude to express their views so that their
constituents can properly judge their actions.142
Georgia then attempted to argue that the Court should not extend
the principle that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open,”143 to cases involving legislators because the
policy of free debate on public issues applies only to the citizencritic.144 The Court also dismissed this argument: “The interest of the
public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by
137 Id. at 394 (“However, assuming that the Court of Appeals did consider to be significant
the fact that petitioner was a sheriff, we do not believe this fact provides any basis for curtailing
his right of free speech.”).
138 Id. at 394–95 (footnote and citation omitted).
139 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
140 Id. at 123–27.
141 Id. at 132–33 (“The State declines to argue that Bond’s statements would violate any
law if made by a private citizen, but it does argue that even though such a citizen might be
protected by his First Amendment rights, the State may nonetheless apply a stricter standard to
its legislators. We do not agree.”).
142 Id. at 135–36 (“The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative
government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues
of policy.”).
143 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
144 Bond, 385 U.S. at 136.
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extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators.”145 The
Court reasoned that not only do legislators have a responsibility to
their constituents to take a position on controversial matters, but also
the electorate is also entitled to “be represented in governmental
debates by the person they have elected to represent them.”146
Taken together, Bond and Wood strongly support the idea that
elected officials enjoy the same protection under the Free Speech
Clause as private citizens—and they perhaps enjoy even greater
latitude.147 But, though the decision in Wood seems explicit, the Court
did not have a clear enough factual record to determine whether
Wood issued his statements in his capacity as sheriff or as a private
citizen.148 Nonetheless, lower courts have interpreted these decisions
as holding that elected officials have very few restraints on their First
Amendment freedoms.149
For example, in Wrzeski v. City of Madison,150 a city
councilwoman challenged an ordinance requiring council members to
vote either “aye” or “nay” on every question put before the council
(in other words, no council member could abstain from voting). The
ordinance authorized the council president to censure any member
who refused to vote and, if that same member refused to vote on a

145 Id.
146 Id.

at 136–37.
William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, the First Amendment, and Executive
Branch Policymaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 378 (1991) (“[A]pplication of the First
Amendment to representatives acting in their official capacities as in Bond is entirely consistent
with Professor Sunstein’s view of that provision as a structural guarantee whose purpose
extends beyond private autonomy to the protection of the republican-envisioned deliberative
process . . . .”).
148 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 393 (1962) (“[T]here was no finding by the trial court
that the petitioner issued the statements in his capacity as sheriff . . . .”).
149 See, e.g., Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 101 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Bond . . . established nearly
forty years ago that the exclusion of an officeholder from her office in retaliation for her
political views is a violation of the First Amendment.”); Camacho v. Brandon, 317 F.3d 153,
166 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he Court recognized in Bond v. Floyd that
representative democracy requires that we provide legislators broad freedom of speech.”);
DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While the free speech rights
of elected officials may well be entitled to broader protection than those of public employees
generally, the underlying rationale remains the same. Legislators are given the widest latitude to
express their views on issues of policy.”) (internal quotations omitted); Gewertz v. Jackman,
467 F. Supp. 1047, 1058 (D.N.J. 1979) (“Bond squarely holds that legislators enjoy the same
degree of first amendment protection as private citizens.”). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have
also determined that legislators enjoy First Amendment rights, but neither relied explicitly on
Bond or Wood. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 1999) (“There is no
question that political expression such as [Councilwoman] Colson's positions and votes on City
matters is protected speech under the First Amendment.”); O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873
F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 1989) (“A city council is not free to retaliate against a member of the
council because of such member's exercise of first amendment rights.”).
150 558 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
147 See
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subsequent issue, to order a civil forfeiture of $100.151 The court,
citing Police Department v. Mosley,152 analyzed the ordinance as a
content-based restriction because “[l]egislators enjoy the same First
Amendment protections as any other members of our society.”153
Before enjoining enforcement of the ordinance, the court noted, “a
representative who consistently dodges difficult or controversial
issues by not voting on them does a disservice to his or her
constituency. However, in our government system, the proper remedy
for such behavior lies with the electorate.”154
The district court in Wrzeski also stated that it might, at first blush,
seem “incongruous” to analyze a legislator’s speech under the First
Amendment.155 But the fact that the speech emanated from an elected
member of the legislative branch is of no moment in terms of the First
Amendment standard applied. According to the court, the difference
lies not in the standard of First Amendment review, but rather the
weight accorded to the government’s interest.156 Therefore, the court
undertook to weigh the interest advanced by the council against the
content-based regulation of the ordinance. In applying this
“compelling government interest test,” the district court found that
requiring councilpersons to vote on every matter did not “tend[] to
further the effective operation of the . . . Council.”157 Thus, according
to the district court in Wrzeski, the proper place to account for the
legislator’s status is in the evaluation of the government’s advanced
interest, rather than a blanket, categorical denial of First Amendment
rights.
Similarly, in Miller v. Town of Hull,158 the First Circuit held that
the Town Selectmen could not suspend the elected commissioners of
the Housing Redevelopment Authority for refusing to vote in
accordance with the Selectmen’s wishes. The court noted: “Although
we have found no cases directly on point, probably because it is
considered unassailable, we have no difficulty finding that the act of
voting on public issues . . . comes within the freedom of speech
guarantee of the first amendment.”159 After citing to Bond, the court
151 Id.

at 665–66.
U.S. 92 (1972).
153 Wrzeski, 558 F. Supp. at 667 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132–33 (1966)).
154 Id. at 668.
155 Id. at 666.
156 See id. at 667–68 (“[T]he council’s need to structure its proceedings in an orderly
fashion is an appropriate consideration in applying the ‘compelling government interest’ test to
the facts of this case.”).
157 Id. at 668.
158 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1989).
159 Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
152 408
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continued: “The right to vote freely . . . derives from the first
amendment, which protects the official statements of legislators.”160
The Town attempted to argue that the suspensions were legitimate
disciplinary actions under one of two theories: political patronage161
and regulation of government employee speech.162 The First Circuit
conceded that “public officials in politically relevant positions may
sometimes be properly removed from office because of their political
affiliation, and because of the political views they express, without
running afoul of the First Amendment,” and that “discharging a
government employee” could be appropriate if his speech hampered
the effective operation of the governmental body.163 But the court
quickly dismissed each of these scenarios as “remote from the one
presented in this case.”164 The court refused to treat the elected
commissioners as “government employees,” presumably because they
were not. Instead, the court reasoned that, as elected officials, they
had “an obligation to take positions on controversial political
questions so that their constituents [could] be fully informed by them,
and be better able to assess their qualifications.”165
Finally, the Supreme Court has recently intimated that candidates
for office enjoy the full and robust protections of the First
Amendment. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,166 the Court
evaluated the “announce clause” of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct. The clause said, “a candidate for judicial office
shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues.”167 This prohibition extended to even “a mere statement of [a
candidate’s] current position, even if he [did] not bind himself to
maintain that position after election.”168 While the announce clause
purports to prohibit candidates for judicial office from discussing the
subject of politics, the Court held that it was an impermissible
content-based ban that “burden[ed] a category of speech . . . at the
core of our First Amendment freedoms—speech about the

160 Id. at 533 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) and Clarke v. United States, 705
F. Supp 605 (D.D.C. 1988)).
161 Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976) (plurality opinion) (patronage dismissals
may be appropriate to ensure political loyalty among policy-making officials).
162 Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983) (disciplining a public employee for
speech on matters of purely personal concern or for speech disrupting the orderly functioning of
the governmental entity does not necessarily violate the First Amendment).
163 Miller, 878 F.2d at 532 n.13 (emphasis added).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 532 (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136–37 (1966)).
166 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
167 Id. at 770 (internal quotation omitted).
168 Id.
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qualifications of candidates for public office.”169 White therefore
supports the proposition that elected officials receive the same First
Amendment protections as private citizens.
These federal precedents, along with the Speech and Debate
Clause, demonstrate that elected officials are inherently different from
government “employees.” Classifying them as mere agents grossly
undervalues the role they play in our society. In actuality, they are
more akin to stewards or trustees of the public welfare, rather than
blind executors of the electorate’s whims. The Speech or Debate
Clause suggests that legislators may be worthy of greater free speech
protections than private citizens, especially when they are carrying
out their legislative duties. This serves not only to protect the
individual legislators right to free expression, but the legislative
branch, as a whole, from encroachment by the other branches.
The Supreme Court of Nevada recently recognized this distinction
in Carrigan v. Commission on Ethics.170 In that case, a city council
member challenged a written censure he received from the Nevada
Ethics Commission for failing to abstain from voting on a measure in
which he had a potential conflict of interest. The district court
concluded that, because voting on a matter before the council was an
official act, the Pickering–Garcetti line of cases applied.171 The
Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed, noting: “[w]hile Carrigan is
employed by the government, he is an elected public officer, and his
relationship with his ‘employer,’ the people, differs from that of other
state employees. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the
Pickering balancing test.”172 The court then proceeded to apply strict
scrutiny.173
In Carrigan, Justice Pickering (ironically enough) issued a lone
dissent. He argued that the majority’s distinguishment of Carrigan’s
employment relationship was “overly simplistic,” because it “does not
take into account the Legislature’s control over local
governments . . . and the constitutional and policy-based imperative
of non-self-interested governmental decisionmakers.”174 Thus, he
169 Id. at 774 (internal quotation omitted). While the Court did not explicitly acknowledge
the subject-matter-based nature of the ban, it did note the following: “There is an obvious
tension between the article of Minnesota’s popularly approved Constitution which provides that
judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s announce clause which places most
subjects of interest to the voters off limits.” Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
170 236 P.3d 616 (Nev. 2010).
171 Id. at 619 (“The Commission and the Legislature (as amicus) assert that the district
court properly concluded that the statute should be reviewed under a less strict standard as
outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering.”).
172 Id. at 622.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 626 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
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would have, like the district court, applied the Pickering balancing
test.
But arguments of this type represent a misunderstanding of strict
scrutiny. This higher level of inquiry does not ignore interests (which
are often weighty) in maintaining impartiality and preventing
corruption and impropriety. Rather, strict scrutiny simply strips away
the presumption of validity that normally attaches to a legislative
enactment and shifts the burden of proof to the government.175 The
solution is not to apply Pickering/Garcetti’s lower level of review,
but rather to accord the government’s stated interests the proper
weight.176
This is what the Supreme Court of the United States did in White.
There, the Court did not distinguish between the First Amendment
rights of elected judges and the First Amendment freedoms of private
citizens.177 Rather, it adhered to the principle expressed in Wood:
“[t]he role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the
more imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on
matters of current public importance.”178 This realization becomes
even more powerful when put into the context of the time: Wood and
Bond, which noted the unqualified First Amendment freedoms of
legislators, were decided several years before cases like Pickering v.
Board of Education179 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents,180 which
175 Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny,
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 359–60 (2006) (“Strict scrutiny varies from ordinary scrutiny by
imposing three hurdles on the government. It shifts the burden of proof to the government;
requires the government to pursue a ‘compelling state interest;’ and demands that the regulation
promoting the compelling interest be ‘narrowly tailored.’”) (internal quotations and footnotes
omitted).
176 Cf. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 993 (7th Cir. 2010) (Rovner, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he solution is to apply strict scrutiny but give proper weight to the exceedingly compelling
interest the state has in ensuring an impartial and fair judiciary.”).
177 Even the dissenting Justices in White each defended the cannon under the assumption
that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 800 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Minnesota has a compelling interest in
sanctioning such statements.”); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In addition to protecting
litigants’ due process rights, the parties in this case further agree, the pledges or promises clause
advances another compelling state interest: preserving the public’s confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of its judiciary.”). See also Siefert, 608 F.3d at 992 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“In
White, it was undisputed and uncontroversial that the court should apply strict scrutiny in
evaluating the content-based restrictions on the canons of judicial conduct.”).
178 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962).
179 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that a school board could not fire a teacher for writing a
newspaper editorial critical of a recent board decision). The Court went on to explain that:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest
that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it
proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior
decisions of this Court.
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soundly rejected the notion that one must give up his constitutional
freedoms upon taking public employment. Thus, it seems legislators
and elected officials had greater liberty to express themselves than
other public “employees” well before cases like Garcetti and there
appears to be little reason to doubt that their expressive freedoms
should be, in any way, limited by it. This further compels the
conclusion that elected representatives, even when acting in their
official capacity, should enjoy First Amendment protections equal to
private citizens.
III. OPEN MEETING LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment protects elected officials’ expression to the
same extent that it protects a private citizen’s expression. “The
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”181 Efficient and effective function of
government may logically enable limiting the free-speech rights of
public employees while they are acting within the scope of their
employment. They are, after all, implementing the already expressed
“will of the people.” But it makes little sense to similarly limit elected
representatives’ speech; for they are charged with gauging, devising,
and enacting those political and social changes. As such, our elected
representatives should be given the broadest latitude in the exercise of
their First Amendment rights.182
But discerning that elected officials have free speech protection
akin to private citizens hardly disposes of the matter. Rather, it
confirms that we must delve deeper into the murky bog of First
Amendment jurisprudence in search of answers to our open meeting
law problems.

Id. at 568.
180 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (“[T]he theory that public employment which may be
denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been
uniformly rejected.” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965).
181 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
182 See supra notes 137, 141 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
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A. Determining the Burden on Elected Officials’ Speech
1. Content-Neutral and Content-Based Restrictions
Most governmental burdens on speech are either content-neutral or
content-based restrictions.183 Content-neutral restrictions “limit
expression without regard to the content or communicative impact of
the message conveyed.”184 Content-based restrictions, on the other
hand, “limit the communication because of the message conveyed.”185
Since content-neutral regulations generally receive much more
deference than content-based ones,186 this question of content has
become central to modern First Amendment jurisprudence.187
When evaluating content-neutral restrictions, for instance, the
Supreme Court is generally concerned that the restrictions undercut
individuals’ ability to communicate their views to others.188 By
reducing the avenues available to communicate, the government
essentially reduces the total amount of discussion. This, in turn,
impedes other core First Amendment values, such as the search for
truth.189 Since laws differ in the number of avenues they restrict, the
Supreme Court tests most content-neutral restrictions by balancing
the government’s interest with the intrusiveness of the restriction,
and, in doing so, the Court attempts to ensure that no less-intrusive
means could achieve the government’s objective.190
On the other hand, the Supreme Court treats content-based
restrictions quite differently. First, the Court generally determines
183 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46
(1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 81 (1978) [hereinafter Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions].
184 Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 182, at 48.
185 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 190 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation].
186 See generally id.
187 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in The Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000)
(“[I]ncreasingly in free speech law, the central inquiry is whether government action is content
based or content neutral.”); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that Are
Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J.
801, 804 (2004) (“The distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws has played a
crucial role in determining the standards of review that are used to measure the constitutionality
of laws that affect freedom of expression.”); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the ContentBased/Content-Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595,
596 (2003) (“The distinction between content-based and content neutral government actions is
fundamental to free speech doctrine.”).
188 Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 192–93.
189 Id. at 193.
190 Id. at 192.
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whether the speech is of low or high value. Low-value speech
(fighting words, child pornography, express incitement, etc.),
generally receives only limited protection. As such, the Court tends to
simply balance the contribution of this low-value speech with
competing government interests and the risk that the law will
inadvertently chill high-value speech.191 High-value speech, though,
tends to receive far greater protection. The Court will often employ
some form of a “clear and present danger” or “compelling
government interest” test. Consequently, the Supreme Court has
invalidated almost every content-based regulation of high-value
speech.192
The Court’s particular hostility to content-based restrictions stems
from three factors: distortion of public debate, improper legislative
motivation for the ban, and the adverse consequences the restrictions
tend to have on the speech’s communicative impact.193 Content-based
burdens distort public debate by effectively eliminating competing
viewpoints or ideas from the marketplace; essentially entrenching the
status quo.194 Additionally, the Court has consistently held that the
government cannot ban a message simply because it disapproves of
it,195 or because it fears the impact the message will have on its
audience, or that the public will not be able to act intelligently in
response to the message.196
2. Subject-Matter Restrictions
At first glance, open meeting laws would seem to fit within this
content-based framework. And the panel opinion in Rangra thought
just that.197 In that case, TOMA required: “Every regular, special, or
191 Id.

at 194–95.
at 196–97. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
193 Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 182, at 254–56.
194 See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 199–200. See also Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981)
(discussing the use of categories in first amendment legal analysis).
195 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“The point of the First
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing
speech on the basis of its content.”).
196 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(The Framers “believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.”).
197 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 584
192 Id.
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called meeting of a governmental body shall be open to the public,
except as provided by this chapter.”198 Open meetings, under this
statute, are those to which the public has access.199 All other meetings
are “closed” meetings.200 The problem identified by the Fifth Circuit
panel concerned the penalty TOMA imposed: any member who
participated in a “closed meeting” was subject to a fine of up to $500
and/or imprisonment of up to six months.201 The court reasoned that
this was a content-based regulation on the elected officials’ speech
and the law, therefore, had to satisfy strict scrutiny.202
While, superficially, the distinction between content-neutral and
content-based restrictions seems straightforward, there are several
subcategories within the content-based realm that the courts afford
various levels of protection.203 Chief among these (for the purpose of
evaluating open meeting laws) are subject-matter restrictions.
Subject-matter restrictions “are directed, not at particular ideas,
viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of
expression.”204
Open meeting laws appear to fall more in-line with subject-matter
restrictions, rather than content-based ones. The laws are directed, not
at the particular ideas being expressed, but at entire subjects of
expression.205 The applicability of the law turns not on whether the
elected official is Republican, Democrat, Green, or Libertarian, but on
whether he discusses the public business before the body at all (or
whatever else his particular state statute prohibits).

F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We agree with the plaintiffs that the criminal provisions of TOMA
are content-based regulations of speech that require the state to satisfy the strict-scrutiny test in
order to uphold them.”).
198 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.002 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). Ohio’s provides: “All
meetings of any public body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(C) (West 1994 & Supp. 2009). In fact, most states use very
similar phrasing. SCHWING, supra note 11, § 6.4, at 256–57.
199 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(5).
200 Id. § 551.001(1). There are some exceptions for “executive sessions,” but these are
rather limited. See id.
201 Id.§ 551.144; Rangra, 566 F.3d at 521–22.
202 See Rangra, 566 F.3d at 521–22.
203 See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 251 (“Careful scrutiny of these
ambiguous restrictions [which do not fit within the content-based, content-neutral dichotomy]
reveals an almost bewildering array of easily masked analytic refinements and distinctions.”).
204 Id. at 239.
205 In the case of TOMA, the law is directed at “a deliberation between a quorum of a
governmental body, or between a quorum of a governmental body and another person, during
which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or
control is discussed or considered.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4). Ohio similarly
targets the specific business of a public body. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (West
1994 &Supp. 2010) (defining “meeting” as “any prearranged discussion of the public business
of the public body by a majority of its members”).
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This distinction between subject-matter and content-based
restrictions is important because the two may entail different levels of
scrutiny, depending upon the values the restriction impinges upon.206
Professor Stone has argued that if the Court wishes to scrutinize
subject-matter restrictions in the same manner as content-based
restrictions, it should be guarding against the same evils—distortion
of debate, improper legislative motivation, and communicative
impact.207
Following this line of reasoning, the dangers of open meeting laws
do not seem to align perfectly with the dangers of content-based
restrictions. The laws are not designed to silence a particular side of
the debate; they simply prohibit elected officials from having the
debate at all unless certain conditions are met. In other words, open
meeting laws appear to be viewpoint-neutral. Their enforcement does
not act to disadvantage any one “side” of the debate. Similarly, open
meeting laws do not appear to stem from an improper legislative
motivation (though it is interesting to note that so few legislatures
have subjected themselves to the constraints of their state’s open
meeting law). And open meeting laws seem to have little or no
relation to the communicative impact of the message; elected officials
can still, ultimately, communicate their message, so long as the
“meeting” is open to the public. But, at the same time, they are not
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions because they
regulate speech based upon its content. So, it seems that evaluating
open meeting laws as subject-matter restrictions is the appropriate
course of action.
But, as appealing as this line of reasoning may be, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on the subject-matter–content-based distinction
is rather murky.208 Perhaps the closest a majority of the Court has
come to endorsing the distinction was in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Commission.209 In Consolidated Edison, the Court held
unconstitutional the Public Service Commission’s order banning
electric utilities from including information about controversial
206 Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 241–42; Stone, Subject-Matter
Restrictions, supra note 182, at 108–15.
207 Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 182.
208 See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1123 (2005) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has never overruled the line of authority disfavoring subject-matter
classifications, and the Court continues to hold many such laws unconstitutional under the
standard of strict scrutiny.”). But see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based
on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
381 (1992) (invalidating a city ordinance because “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”).
209 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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political topics in their billing statements.210 The Commission had
allowed “inserts that present[ed] certain information to consumers on
certain subjects,” but it forbade “the use of inserts that discuss[ed]
public controversies.”211 The Commission attempted to defend the
restriction using several theories, including arguing that the ban was a
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction, or that it was a
permissible subject-matter restriction.212 The Court rejected each of
these arguments in turn, noting that “[g]overnmental action that
regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter ‘slip[s] from the
neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about
content.’”213 Additionally, the Court held that this was not one of the
“narrow circumstances” where subject-matter regulation was
permissible.214
The Supreme Court elaborated on of these “narrow circumstances”
in a footnote, explaining: “when courts are asked to determine
whether a species of speech is covered by the First Amendment, they
must look to the content of expression.”215 Here, though, the Court
appears to have only been concerned with discerning classifications
of low-value speech, such as commercial speech, libel, obscenity,
fighting words, or indecent speech.216 The Court also distinguished
cases such as Greer v. Spock217 and Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights218 as instances of private parties asserting a right of access to
public facilities, rather than as cases where the government prohibited
a person from using his own resources to disseminate a message on a
disfavored subject.219
But instead of looking at this problem through the lens of access
rights, courts should distinguish between the two flavors of subjectmatter restrictions: those that perpetuate the evils of content-based
restrictions, and those that operate more like content-neutral bans.
This would clarify the problem courts face when evaluating open
meeting laws. For example, when the Fifth Circuit in Rangra
210 Id.
211 Id.

at 537.
id. at 535.
213 Id. at 536 (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972)) (alteration in
original).
214 Id. at 538.
215 Id. at 538 n.5.
216 Id.
217 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding federal prohibition of partisan political speech on
military bases, even though bases could choose to allow civilian speakers on other topics).
218 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion) (upholding the City Transit System’s ban on
political advertising on busses, even though it allowed commercial advertising).
219 See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he Commission’s attempt to restrict
the free expression of a private party cannot be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests on
the special interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property.”).
212 See
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confronted the issue, it felt compelled to apply strict scrutiny because
the law looked like a content-based restriction on speech. Analyzing
the law as what it actually is (a subject-matter restriction) however,
would allow for a more nuanced—and accurate—analysis of the
impact of the law, and would ultimately open up a bevy of options for
reviewing courts, rather than forcing them to apply a categorical
strict-scrutiny analysis. Indeed, Justice Stevens appears to have
recognized this distinction in his concurrence to R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul.220
B. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
By correctly identifying subject-matter restrictions as such, the
Court can avail itself of more nuanced standards of review, while at
the same time respecting precedent. But adopting Professor Stone’s
distinction between subject-matter and content-based restrictions will
not entirely dispose of the problem, due to the two different flavors of
subject-matter restrictions: those that mimic the effects of contentbased restrictions and those that have effects similar to contentneutral restrictions. But even if the reviewing court treats those
subject-matter restrictions that narrowly restrict speech on specific
issues (like the Mosely ordinance, which focused only on labor
speech) as content-based restrictions, and those which sweep more
broadly (which, by implication, remove the possibility of illicit
legislative motive) as content-neutral restrictions, this still will not
address the harms effected by broad-based open meeting laws.
What is required is an approach that will give courts flexibility in
their analysis, and enable them to ferret out those laws truly adverse
to the core values of the First Amendment. If the court identifies
certain risks at play in a law that track closely with those of traditional
content-based restrictions (i.e., distortion of debate, improper
legislative motive, and restrictive communicative impact), then it can
appropriately apply strict scrutiny. This is especially apposite if the
subject-matter restriction appears to be viewpoint-based. If, however,
the law operates in a more content-neutral manner (i.e., there is not
220 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“More particularly to the matter of
content-based regulations, we have implicitly distinguished between restrictions on expression
based on subject matter and restrictions based on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are
particularly pernicious.”). Justices Stevens and Kennedy seem to be engaged in an interesting
debate over this issue. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I adhere to my view, however, that content-based speech restrictions
that do not fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into
narrow tailoring or compelling government interests. . . . The political speech of candidates is at
the heart of the First Amendment, and direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are
simply beyond the power of government to impose.”).

2/14/2011 4:20:03 PM

2011]

OPEN MEETINGS AND CLOSED MOUTHS

587

much concern about viewpoint discrimination, the law only burdens
one mode of expression, etc.), then the court can apply a less exacting
method of scrutiny.221
Although the Supreme Court has generally applied this more
flexible balancing approach to most content-neutral restrictions, it has
employed strict scrutiny when dealing with some particularly
offensive ones.222 Although this type of heightened review is rare, it
tends to come into play when a law acts to shut off not just one mode
of communication (like most content-neutral restrictions) but several
or all means of expressing an idea.223 Therefore, simply discerning
whether the dangers of a particular subject-matter restriction more
closely approximate those of a content-based or content-neutral
restriction does not end our inquiry.224 Instead, we must take an
approach similar to a continuum, and look to the various levels of
analysis the Court has afforded the different forms of restrictions,
based upon the dangers each seeks to prevent, and then proceed to
align these with the subject-matter restriction at hand.225
IV. ANALYZING OPEN MEETING LAWS
Citizens have an interest in knowing the actions of their elected
representatives; how else can the public evaluate their performance
come election time? But representatives have just as great an interest
in informing the electorate of their activities; how else are we to
reelect them? The problem lies in the fact that much of the public
does not trust (or, at least, has been led to believe that they should not
trust) those in office. Many of the open meeting laws were knee-jerk
reactions, either to Watergate specifically or some other, more local,
scandal.226 But these attempts at reassuring an apprehensive electorate
221 For a discussion on the various levels of review the Court has given content-neutral
restrictions, see Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184.
222 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating the expenditure limitations
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 that forbid any person from spending more than
$1,000 on the campaign of any political candidate).
223 See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 182, at 58–60.
224 See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1405 (2006) (“[A]s to
both of these concerns [(viewpoint and subject-matter restrictions)], it is clear that they cannot
be properly assessed in a vacuum looking just at the content-based character of a restriction. As
discussed earlier, one must also assess other characteristics of a speech regulation, such as its
temporal, spatial, or other breadth of application, and the nature of the burden being placed on
engaging in the regulated expression.”).
225 See Schauer, supra note 193, at 299 (“There is a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. The
question is not whether we permit judges to balance in the particular case, but rather how much
authority the governing rule should allocate to the judge to take account of the particular
circumstances of the case at hand.”).
226 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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often required subsequent amendments to account for such things as
informal discussions that, upon further reflection by state legislatures,
were later deemed more valuable when held in private.227
There is no question that public bodies should take any and all
official action in public. But laws like TOMA, which require every
discussion between a quorum of members of an elected body
regarding any issue that could conceivably come before the body be
held in an “open” meeting, go too far.228 The following Section views
open meeting laws as subject-matter restrictions, and proceeds to
apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the laws of Texas and Ohio.
A. Analysis of Texas’ Open Meeting Law
The most troubling aspect of open meeting laws that reach as
broadly as TOMA is that they whittle down an elected official’s
opportunity to communicate (especially with his elected colleagues)
to one defined instance: the open meeting. To compound the problem,
the State does not always clearly define when that instance occurs.
Normally it depends on interpreting other terms, such as “meeting” or
“deliberation” or some other qualifying factor. This interpretation is
often not done by the legislature, but rather, when the statute requires
the imposition of criminal penalties, the executive (in the form of the
prosecutor). Additionally, the imposition of criminal penalties—
including imprisonment—creates a substantial chilling effect on the
speech of elected officials, the individuals among whom we most
want to create the conditions for free debate. But laws like TOMA
foster the possibility that an aggressive executive, in conjunction with
a potentially hostile judiciary, could encroach upon the legislative
branch—not unlike the encroachment the Framers sought to prevent
by enacting the Speech or Debate Clause.
1. TOMA Generally
Although the hallmarks of content-based burdens (viewpoint
discrimination, distortion of public debate, or illicit legislative
motive) are not glaringly present, TOMA does limit all means of
227 For example, Florida’s open meetings law currently has around 85 exemptions. Sandra
F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: A Model
for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open
Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 260 (2008).
228 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 6.6, at 259 (“Members of local public bodies, however,
may be unable to live normal lives if they risk violating the open meeting law every time they
attend a PTA meeting, go to worship, shop for groceries, or attend a wedding or party. Strict
enforcement of an all encompassing statute would ensure that virtually no one would be willing
to serve on local public bodies.”).
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expression—not just speech by mail, or telephone, but all of it—on
political subjects in a large number of instances. Any time a quorum
of a public body is together, and the meeting is not “open”229 (or does
not fall within one of the “executive session” exceptions),230 the
members violate the open meeting act if they even discuss any
“public business or public policy over which the governmental body
has supervision or control.”231 In order to “open” the meeting (or even
have a legal closed one), the members must give notice to the public,
which requires a posting “in a place readily accessible to the general
public at all times for at least 72 hours before the scheduled time of
the meeting.”232 What is most troubling about this is that the Texas
Attorney General’s Handbook on Open Meetings warns that the State
will apply the open meetings law even to informal gatherings of
officials if they discuss public business.233
Assume two of a town’s three elected city councilpersons (call
them A and B) are standing in line at the supermarket on a Saturday
morning. The line is long; five or six persons deep, and A and B are
standing next to each other at the end. The matters of public policy
over which a city council has control are so numerous as to defy any
attempt to quantify them. Yet A and B can discuss none of these
topics. For instance, assume the town’s high school football team won
their game the night before and finished the regular season
undefeated. Can A turn around and, without violating the open
meeting law, say to B: “Hey, did you see the football team won last
night? That’s our first undefeated season in school history! We should
do something to recognize them. Let’s write a resolution
congratulating them!”? What if, instead of A posing the idea then, the
resolution was already on the agenda for a council meeting the
following Monday. Could A and B discuss the football team at all,
knowing that the resolution is pending?234
229 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.041 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (“A governmental body
shall give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the
governmental body.”).
230 See generally id. §§ 551.071–088 (listing acceptable reasons for entering executive
session).
231 Id. § 551.001(4)(A).
232 Id. § 551.043.
233 ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., OPEN MEETINGS 2010 HANDBOOK 18 (2010), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/openmeeting_hb.pdf (“When a quorum of the
members of a governmental body assembles in an informal setting, such as a social occasion, it
will be subject to the requirements of the Act if the members engage in a verbal exchange about
public business or policy.”).
234 Cf. Gardner v. Herring, 21 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, 2000) (genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether an open meeting violation occurred where president of a
school board informed a “congregation” of the board about a lawsuit that had just been filed
against her in her official capacity and some members of the board remarked that this was
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Obviously this is an absurd example. But it illustrates the absurdity
of the law. A and B could spend six months in jail and pay a fine of
$500 for talking about football while standing in line at the grocery
store.
2. First Amendment Analysis
Rangra v. Brown serves as a good test case for analyzing
TOMA.235 The Fifth Circuit treated TOMA as a content-based
restriction “because whether a quorum of public officials may
communicate with each other outside of an open meeting depends on
whether the content of their speech refers to ‘public business or public
policy over which the governmental body has supervision or
control.’”236 While this is by no means an incorrect interpretation
(especially in light of the Supreme Court’s affinity for the contentbased–content-neutral dichotomy), “[n]ot all content-based
regulations are alike; [the Supreme Court] clearly recognize[s] that
some content-based restrictions raise more constitutional questions
than others.”237
Elected officials should be entitled to greater First Amendment
protection than other government employees.238 Open meeting laws
clearly burden a type of core (or “high value”) speech: political.239
They regulate what elected officials can say about politics. But they
are not so invidious as to warrant strict scrutiny. Instead, courts
should utilize Justice Stevens’ formulation in R.A.V. That way, in
addition to looking at the type of expression burdened, courts
evaluating open meeting laws would also examine: 1) the nature of
the restriction, 2) the context surrounding the restriction, and 3) the
scope of the restriction.240 This deviation from traditional “strict”
“regrettable”). Even though the resolution is non-binding, it is an official act of the
governmental body on a matter of public concern. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-95 (March 4,
1992), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1992/pdf/dm
0095.pdf (advising that if a quorum of a governmental body issued a signed “joint statement” on
a subject falling within TOMA, the deliberations leading to the creation of the joint statement
must occur in an open meeting). Thus, it would qualify as official business under Texas law.
235 See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text for the facts of Rangra.
236 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 522 (2009) dismissed as moot en banc by 584 F.3d 206
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)).
237 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
238 See supra Part II.B–C.
239 See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that, in the realm of
political expression, First Amendment protection is “at its zenith”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 39 (1976) (holding that campaign expenditure restrictions “limit political expression ‘at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’” (quoting Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).
240 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 429–32 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Ysursa v. Pocatello
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scrutiny is not due to the fact that elected officials are government
employees, but rather to the nature of the restriction at hand. Thus, if
an open meeting law were applied to a completely “private” citizen,
this is the same level of inquiry that courts should utilize.241
a) TOMA as a Subject-Matter Restriction
As discussed above, TOMA is a subject-matter restriction.242 It
constrains elected officials’ ability to communicate with their fellow
legislators regarding “public business or public policy over which the
governmental body has supervision or control” to one defined
instance: the open meeting.243 Any violation results in a fine of up to
$500 and imprisonment for up to six months.244 Whether these
meetings are happenstance (in the supermarket, at a coffee shop, at
the high school football game, etc.), inadvertent (clicking “reply all”
to an email), or completely intentional (the proverbial “smoke-filled
backroom”) is of no matter. The law focuses on whether elected
officials speak on a disfavored subject, at disfavored times, and under
disfavored conditions.
TOMA, however, does not appear to rise to the extreme level of
the subject-matter restriction in Mosely, as the legislature’s asserted
purpose is to enhance government, not restrict viewpoint. Indeed, the
law appears to be applied evenhandedly, not based upon what view
the elected official is espousing, merely whether or not he is talking
about the disfavored subject at a “closed” meeting. Thus, there does

Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1103 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that, when
competing constitutional interests are at play, the court should consider “[1] the seriousness of
the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, [2] the importance of the provision's
countervailing objectives, [3] the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve those
objectives, and [4] whether there are other less restrictive ways of doing so”); Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]here a law
significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways—the
Court has closely scrutinized the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained from
employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it has balanced
interests. And in practice that has meant asking whether the statute burdens any one such
interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others.”).
241 If, however, courts reject the distinction between subject-matter restrictions and full-out
content-based restrictions, then they should proceed to evaluate open meeting laws using the
traditional method of strict scrutiny. My point is that the seemingly lower level of inquiry I
utilize here has nothing to do with the fact that the individuals at issue are elected officials; it is
the same level that I would apply to any subject-matter restriction that operates to choke off all
forms of communication with regard to a disfavored subject.
242 See supra Part III.A.ii.
243 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
244 Id. § 551.144(b).
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not appear to be an invidious governmental motive behind the
restriction.
Whether TOMA distorts debate is a more complex question. True,
open meetings laws affect only the members of public bodies subject
to the act. As such, one could argue that the impact on public debate
is minimal. But this would be a narrow view indeed. Rather, TOMA
distorts the debate. It prevents our elected legislators from fleshing
out their positions on public issues with each other. Instead, they are
often forced to debate issues behind closed doors with their aids and
staff. But, why not just have the debate in the open meeting with their
elected colleagues? As Professor Welborn’s study suggests—and
what our infatuation with the 24-hour news media has likely
enhanced—the risk of embarrassment a member faces from appearing
ill-informed at a public meeting (like, when he’s seeing an issue of
first impression) or, worse, “flip flopping” on a position after being
persuaded by a thoughtful, intellectual discussion with a fellow
elected representative at an open meeting, likely dissuades even the
most boisterous representative with even an inkling of wanting to be
reelected.245 This results in an “open meeting” that is no more than a
perfunctory exercise and devoid of any real discussion.
Finally, as Rangra illustrates, TOMA chokes off all forms of
communication on its disfavored subject. Whether the chosen method
be email, telephone, letter, in person, probably even smoke signal, is
of no moment. All communication between a quorum or more of an
elected body is forbidden unless the meeting is “open.” Such a broad
sweep takes TOMA squarely out of the content neutral designation,
and elevates it to a more disfavored position.246
b) The Context Surrounding TOMA Suggests Invalidation
“If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from
fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply
engaging in political speech.”247 TOMA’s criminal penalties and
overreaching definition of “meeting,” which leads to unnecessary
nuance, create a significant chilling effect on elected officials’ speech.
Against this backdrop, any potentially asserted justifications of
efficient or effective functioning of government or of combating the
appearance or existence of corruption prove unavailing.
245 See

supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“A regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral . . . . Government regulation
of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech.”) (internal quotations omitted).
247 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010).
246 Cf.
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Here, the criminal penalties (particularly imprisonment) are not
necessary to the proper functioning of open meeting laws. In
actuality, few states allow judges to imprison violators of an open
meeting law.248 At least sixteen states do not authorize criminal
penalties for violations of their open meetings law at all.249 This
shows that criminal penalties, particularly imprisonment, are not
necessary to the proper and effective functioning of open meeting
laws.250
Furthermore, the lawsuits themselves (particularly, Rangra and,
more recently, City of Alpine v. Abbott251) further evince a finding that
TOMA chills elected officials’ speech. The councilpersons in Rangra
sued to prevent the local district attorney from indicting them again
over fears that their emails violated TOMA. The suit in City of Alpine
consists of three Texas cities and at least sixteen elected officials who
fear prosecution for a violation of TOMA.252
This fear is enhanced by the incredibly broad reach of the law
resulting from the definition of “meeting.” For instance, one Texas
Attorney General’s Opinion advises, “agenda preparation procedures
may not involve deliberations among a quorum of members of a
governmental body except in a public meeting for which notice has
been posted in accordance with the act.”253 This is essentially what
the councilpersons in Rangra were indicted for: using a series of
emails to arrange a special meeting and discussing the purpose
thereof.
Another advisory opinion argued:
If a quorum of a governmental body agrees on a joint
statement on a matter of such business or policy, the
deliberation by which that agreement is reached is subject to
the requirements of the act, and those requirements are not

248 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 8.60, at 511 n.266. While not purporting to list every
state that imposes criminal punishment, it only lists seven separate states that have
imprisonment as an available sanction. Id.
249 Id. § 8.58, at 509. These include: Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and Washington. Id.
250 Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908–09 (“The anticorruption interest is not sufficient
to displace the speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent
expenditures by for-profit corporations. The Government does not claim that these expenditures
have corrupted the political process in those States.”).
251 730 F. Supp. 2d. 630 (W.D. Tex. 2010).
252 The City of Big Lake withdrew as a plaintiff. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, City of
Alpine¸730 F. Supp. 2d 630 (No. P:09-CV-59), 2010 WL 516941.
253 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. DM-473, at 3 (Apr. 13, 1998), available at http://www.oag.state.
tx.us/opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1998/pdf/dm0473.pdf.

2/14/2011 4:20:03 PM

594

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

necessarily avoided by avoiding the physical gathering of a
quorum in one place at one time.254
Yet another advisory opinion provides that the members of a
commissioner’s court cannot sign or approve an invoice, claim, or bill
unless such action occurs at an open meeting.255
In a word, these restrictions are silly. Elected officeholders should
not have to be looking over their shoulders for the district attorney
every time they prepare an agenda. Nor should the district attorney
have to police such a trivial matter as whether the city council
correctly met in an open meeting before issuing a joint statement. All
of this comes into greater focus when we remember that these bodies
are often small city and town councils that “may not have legal
representation at their meetings and may depend on volunteers
serving without pay or with minimal compensation, so that criminal
penalties may be perceived to be excessive and to deter public
service.”256
c) TOMA’s Scope May be Narrow, but It Has a Potent Impact
on the Level and Quality of Political Debate
TOMA extends only to those situations where elected members of
a governmental body are talking about the public business under their
jurisdiction while in the presence of a quorum. But the law’s sweep is
what is most disconcerting. While Texas may argue that TOMA
merely regulates the efficient functioning of the government,257 or
that the appearance and prevention of corruption are sufficiently
substantial interests to justify the burdens imposed by the statute,258
the facts belie this claim.
Statutes as onerous as TOMA, in all likelihood, do more to hinder
efficient and effective government than they do to promote it. They
drive substantive discussions about policy—which used to and should
254 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-95 at 5-6 (Mar. 4, 1992), available at http://www.oag.state.
tx.us/opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1992/pdf/dm0095.pdf.
255 Tex.
Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0307, at 1–2 (Nov. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/49cornyn/op/2000/pdf/JC0307.pdf.
256 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 8.60, at 510.
257 Cf. Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848, 854 (3rd Cir. 1981) (holding that the New Jersey
State Senate’s procedural rules governing debate are not unconstitutional because the State has a
substantial interest in ensuring the efficient functioning of its legislature); Kucinich v. Forbes,
432 F. Supp. 1101, 1114 n.18 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (noting that the efficient functioning of council
is a substantial interest which may allow for regulation of speech).
258 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (“The contribution ceilings thus serve the
basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly
impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and
discussion.”).
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take place among the elected officials—to conference rooms with
staffs and aides.259 Any substantive debate on even the most menial of
resolutions, joint statements,260 or even the meeting’s agenda,261
requires an open meeting. Or, in the event that a governmental body
requires, for instance, two of the three elected commissioners to sign
an invoice before the treasury will pay it, an open meeting is
required.262 Unless these discussions fall into one of a few
exceptions,263 they must be conducted in accordance with TOMA,
which requires them to post notice of the “meeting” at least 72 hours
in advance.264 So our three-member, “effective and efficient” town
council can’t pay its bills, issue a joint statement, or set its agenda
without a 72-hour lag period.
Furthermore, the efficacy of open meeting laws is dubious to begin
with.265 Many were passed in the wake of Watergate to placate an
irate press and reassure a petulant electorate.266 It is with this history
in mind that a court must weigh the public’s interest in avoiding the
appearance of corruption, against the significant burdens to our
representatives’ free speech rights. What’s more, some believe that it
is mere folly for a court to attempt to divine what influences a
particular legislator in the first place. As one court noted:
The mental gymnastics of each legislator operates in an
unpredictable universe of its own, unfettered by law. Such
mental operations are not confined to moments when all are
assembled on the public stage. Any attempt to control them
has no probability of success, constitutes an interference with
the power of a separate branch of government and interferes
with personal rights of privacy.267

259 See

supra Part I.B.
Att’y Gen. Op. DM-95 (Mar. 4, 1992), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1992/pdf/dm0095.pdf.
261 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. DM-473 (Apr. 13, 1998), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1998/pdf/dm0473.pdf.
262 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0307 (Nov. 20, 2000), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
opinions/opinions/49cornyn/op/2000/pdf/JC0307.pdf.
263 For example, TOMA permits an exception to the general rule requiring 72 hours notice
in “emergency” situations. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.045 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
“Emergency” is confined to either “an imminent threat to public health or safety” or “a
reasonably unforeseeable situation.” Even here, the meeting still requires two hours notice. Id.
264 Id. § 551.043(a).
265 See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
266 From 1972 to 1973, 19 states either enacted (for the first time) open meetings laws or
strengthened already existing ones. SCHWING, supra note 11, at 3–4.
267 Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 259 N.E.2d 522, 530 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1970), aff’d, 274 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio App. 2d 1971).
260 Tex.
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Another court notes: “There are, of course, some activities, legal if
engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with others, but
political expression is not one of them.”268 The only exception is
combating the appearance of (or actual) corruption on the part of
public officials.269 In certain circumstances, fighting the appearance
of impropriety is a compelling interest that, if narrowly tailored, will
support restrictions on speech.270 But TOMA fails this narrow
tailoring requirement. It is nowhere near narrowly tailored to serve
the interest of combating perceived or actual impropriety. Other states
achieve the same objective with a much narrower definition of
meeting.271 Furthermore, criminalizing TOMA violations serves to
chill an unnecessary amount of speech that is, in all likelihood,
unrelated to the statute’s goal of preventing the appearance of
corruption. “Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity.”272 This is especially true when laws that may be
vague273 impose criminal penalties for a violation. In such cases,
“[c]lose examination of the specificity of the statutory limitation is
required where . . . the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an
area permeated by First Amendment interests.”274 TOMA also
empowers the executive to enforce it, a power that the Founders
feared when they drafted the Speech or Debate Clause. This risk of
encroachment on the legislative branch by an overzealous executive
(who has the power to impose criminal sanctions on legislators) is
further reason to strike down the criminal provisions of TOMA.
Because TOMA is a subject-matter restriction that chokes off all
mediums of communication on political speech, unless certain
conditions are met, and imposes criminal sanctions for any violation,
268 Citizens

Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981).
at 296–97 (“Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on
political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception
of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate.”).
270 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–76, 777 n.7 (2002) (noting
that while upholding the appearance of impartiality and actual impartiality are compelling
interests, Minnesota’s statute was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (“[T]he Act's primary purpose—to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions [. . . is] a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.”).
271 See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.
272 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940)).
273 See,
e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0326 (May 18, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2005/pdf/ga0326.pdf (responding to
an inquiry about whether TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.143 is unconstitutionally vague).
Although the opinion concluded that the law was not vague, it is curious that it had to be issued
at all.
274 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40–41.
269 Id.
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it unconstitutionally impinges upon the free speech rights of elected
officials and cannot stand.
B. Analysis of Ohio’s Open Meeting Law
Ohio’s open meeting law (OML) contrasts starkly with TOMA.
Ohio confines a “meeting” to “any prearranged discussion of the
public business of the public body by a majority of its members.”275
By limiting “meetings” to “prearranged” discussions, it avoids the
chance encounters that could easily occur in Texas and states with
similar laws. And, Ohio has no specific method for notice, and no
minimum time that notice has to be posted. Rather, each body is
responsible for maintaining a rule that provides for “reasonable”
methods of providing notice.276 And no body can call a “special”
meeting unless they provide 24-hour notice to any media outlets and
interested persons who have requested advance notice of any special
meetings.277 Courts must void any action taken in a meeting that
violates the OML and force the offending body to pay a civil
forfeiture of $500 to the plaintiff.278 Furthermore, any official action
that derived from deliberations held in violation of the OML is also
void.279 Additionally, the body must pay court costs and the plaintiff’s
reasonable attorney’s fees.280
Ohio’s open meeting law, while still a subject-matter restriction,
should survive a First Amendment challenge because it has a more
circumscribed definition of “meeting” and lacks the chilling effect
imposed by criminal sanctions.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Keep in mind that this Note does not advocate changing the open
meeting laws with regard to administrative agencies or other bodies
that do not include elected public officials. Under the Garcetti
rationale, those limitations appear to be permissible.281 Nor does it
275 OHIO
276 Id.

REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2010).
§ 121.22(F).

277 Id.
278 Id.

§ 121.22(I)
§ 121.22(H) (“A resolution, rule, or formal action adopted in an open meeting that
results from deliberations in a meeting not open to the public is invalid unless the deliberations
were for a purpose specifically authorized in division (G) or (J) of this section and conducted at
an executive session held in compliance with this section.”).
280 Id. § 121.22(I).
281 They are also, arguably, more soundly grounded in policy. Agencies are, for the most
part, “agents” of the legislature, tasked by the legislature with carrying out specific functions in
a designated area. The legislative body’s interest in observing their operations and ensuring their
proper functioning is heightened by the different nature of the relationship.
279 Id.
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counsel the skirting of open meetings by elected officials. Our elected
representatives should aspire to inform us not only of their decisions
and official actions, but also the underlying rationale. Open meeting
laws should simply serve to remind them of this duty, not to punish
them for inadvertently violating it.
Some may see a decision striking the criminal penalties from open
meeting laws as a step back, a blow to open government. Or, perhaps,
as encouraging elected officials to meet privately and revert to the
days of the “backroom deal.” They may also argue that we will be
less able to monitor our elected representatives. While these are
plausible concerns, in reality they are likely to be overblown
posturing.
There is an easy fix to any of the above criticisms: vote for
someone else. If you truly do not trust your representative to work in
your interest, or if you think that he is going behind your back to
strike deals that benefit him (and not you), you should vote for
someone else. Those truly bent on conducting business in “smokefilled rooms” (i.e. the egregious offenders who are the targets of these
laws) will do so despite an open meeting law,282 so the persons
generally punished are those who either inadvertently violate the
statute or those who are charged as a pretext for some other offense
(which, as appears to be the case in Rangra, can be a political
disagreement with some other member or branch of the government).
The monitoring problem may still exist, but this is more than
compensated for by most states’ freedom of information acts, and the
remaining aspects of the open meeting law. I do not think anyone
would question the wisdom of requiring any and all official actions of
the government to be recorded and taken in public, which open
meeting laws do. Additionally, most states’ freedom of information
acts make the records of those decisions available for inspection.
Deliberations should be uninhibited. States like Texas, with a
broad definition of meeting (which encompass everything from staff
briefings, to chance encounters at the supermarket, to actual,
convened formal meetings), should narrow their statutes to envelope a
more realistic number of discussions, preferably only those that are
prearranged and where decisions are generally made. This would still
serve the purpose of open meeting laws (by keeping the public
informed about the official actions of their governments), while at the
same time enabling elected representatives to debate the merits of an
282 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (“[N]o substantial societal interest would
be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that permitted
unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain
improper influence over candidates for elective office.”).
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issue candidly, and without the pressure and fear of having their
initial impressions of a proposal posted to the internet and streamed in
real-time.
States should similarly strike the criminal penalties that attach to
violations. In many instances, the people serving in these elected
capacities are our friends and neighbors, who do the job for little or
no pay and usually even less appreciation. Having them run around
frantic in search of an attorney to tell them whether the conversation
they just had at the supermarket might put them in jail for the next six
months is a great way to show our gratitude for their service to our
community.
CONCLUSION
Elected officials enjoy the same free speech protections as private
citizens. The government cannot regulate their speech outright
without running afoul of the First Amendment. And, empowering one
branch to police the speech of another (especially when the executive
patrols the legislature) raises serious separation of powers concerns,
and serves to unnecessarily chill the speech of legislators and inhibits
robust, wide-open debate on controversial issues. With this in mind,
the government cannot simply assert its “interests as an employer” to
justify curtailing elected officials’ First Amendment rights. Their
“employment” relationship is sufficiently different than other
government employees, who are not elected or directly accountable to
people. Therefore, courts must evaluate the constitutionality of open
meeting laws (as applied to the speech of elected officials) as if they
were evaluating the speech a private citizen, and not a public
“employee” under the Garcetti test.
Since elected officials have broad First Amendment rights, a
court’s initial evaluation of these freedoms must look much the same
as if those laws were being applied to a private citizen. Because open
meeting laws completely eviscerate all means of communication with
regard to political issues (except at certain, favored times), they
should be treated as subject-matter restrictions, and not blindly
evaluated under the strict-scrutiny analysis reserved for purely
content-based regulations. Instead, the reviewing court must look to
the underlying harms of the restriction, and inquire whether it was
born of an illicit governmental motive, discriminates based upon
viewpoint, or completely chokes off all means of communication on a
specific subject. It must then look to the context of the regulation and
its scope. In the case of TOMA, the broad sweep encompassed by the
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definition of “meeting” and the imposition of criminal penalties on
violators tend to point towards invalidation of the restrictions.
In light of this analysis, states should take steps to remove the
criminal sanctions accompanying their open meeting laws and
consider narrowing the definition of “meeting,” so as to better
facilitate debate amongst their elected representatives. While our First
Amendment doctrine is by no means perfect, we should take care not
to hamper the free speech of those we entrust to debate the merits of
issues affecting the public welfare. Instead, we should foster
conditions that allow them to conclude that is in the best interest of
the general good. President Adams once wrote: “When people talk of
the freedom of writing[,] speaking or thinking, I cannot choose but
laugh. No such thing ever existed. No such thing now exists: but I
hope it will exist. But it must be hundreds of years after you and I
shall write and speak no more.”283 Today, we are closer to the
existence of these freedoms than ever before; but they still do not yet
exist. And they may never exist. But that does not mean that we
should cease to aspire towards a time when those freedoms do exist in
the way that our Founders envisioned.
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